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Tipping in Restaurants and Around the Globe: An Interdisciplinary Review  
Michael Lynn 
Introduction 
       On an average day, approximately ten percent of the U.S. population eats at sit-
down/family restaurants.  In an average month, approximately 58% do so (Media 
Dynamics, 2001).  After completing their meals, almost all of these restaurant diners 
leave a voluntary gift of money (or tip) for the server who waited on them (Speer, 1997).  
These tips, which amount to approximately $21 billion a year, are an important source of 
income for the nation’s two million waiters and waitresses (Lynn, 2003b).  In fact, tips 
sometimes represent 100 percent of waiters and waitresses take home pay, because tax 
withholding eats up all of their hourly wages (Mason, 2002). 
      Of course, tipping is not confined to restaurant servers or to the United States. In the 
U.S., consumers also tip barbers, bartenders, beauticians, bellhops, casino croupiers, 
chambermaids, concierges, delivery persons, doormen, golf caddies, limousine drivers, 
maitre-d’s, masseuses, parking attendants, pool attendants, porters, restaurant musicians, 
washroom attendants, shoeshine boys, taxicab drivers, and tour guides among others 
(Star, 1988).  Although not as common as in the U.S., tipping is also practiced in most 
countries around the world (Putzi, 2002). In fact, national differences in tipping are a 
source of uncertainty for many international travelers and local tipping practices are a 
topic covered in most travel guides.  
      Tipping is an interesting economic behavior, not only because it is widespread and 
practically important, but also because it is an expense that consumers are free to avoid.  
Although called for by social norms, tips are not legally required.  Furthermore, since tips 
are not given until after services have been rendered, they are not necessary to get good 
service in establishments that are infrequently patronized.  For this reason, many 
economists regard tipping as “mysterious” or “seemingly irrational” behavior (e.g., Ben-
Zion and Karni, 1977; Frank, 1987; Landsburg, 1993).  The present chapter explores this 
behavior and its implications for economic theory and public policy.  
       The chapter is divided into four sections. The first two sections provide more detail 
about the phenomenon of tipping by summarizing and discussing the results of empirical 
research on the determinants and predictors of restaurant tipping and of national 
differences in tipping customs respectively. Then, economic theories about tipping are 
reviewed in light of the previously summarized empirical literature. Finally, the public 
welfare and policy issues raised by tipping are discussed.  
 
Determinants and Predictors of Restaurant Tipping 
       Restaurant tips in the United States vary substantially across dining occasions, dining 
parties, servers, and restaurants. Numerous studies attempting to explain this variability 
in restaurant tipping have appeared in the psychology and hospitality management 
literatures and a few such studies are beginning to appear in the economics literature 
(e.g., Bodvarsson and Gibson, 1994; Bodvarsson, Luksetich and Mcdermott, 2003; 
Conlin, Lynn and O’Donahue, 2003; Lynn and McCall, 2000a; McCrohan and Pearl, 
1991). This research has generally relied upon one or more of the following three 
methodologies: 
(1) researchers have stood outside of restaurants and conducted exit surveys of 
departing patrons about their just completed service encounters and tipping 
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behaviors,  
(2) researchers have created panels of consumers who agreed to keep diaries of 
their restaurant dining experiences and tipping behavior, and  
(3) researchers have recruited restaurant servers to record information about their 
own behavior, their customers’ characteristics, and the tips those customers leave.  
Among the variables whose effects on restaurant tipping have been studied using these 
methodologies are bill size, payment method, dining party size, service quality, server 
friendliness, server sex, customer sex, customer patronage frequency, customer ethnicity, 
and various interactions between these variables. The results of this research are briefly 
reviewed in the paragraphs below. 
 
Bill Size  
       Social norms in the United States call for tipping restaurant servers 15 to 20 percent 
of the bill, so it should not be surprising that dollar tip amounts are positively related to 
bill size. What may be surprising is how strong this relationship is. In a quantitative 
review of 36 studies involving 5, 016 dining parties from over 40 restaurants, Lynn and 
McCall (2000b) found that 69 percent of the average within-restaurant variability in 
dollar tip amounts can be explained by bill size alone. This suggests that bill size is twice 
as powerful as all other factors combined in determining dollar tip amounts within 
restaurants.  
       Of course, the effects of bill size are not invariant. Research suggests that bill size 
predicts dollar tip amounts better when the tipper is a regular patron of the restaurant 
(Lynn and Grassman, 1990), the tipper has higher income and education (Lynn and 
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Thomas-Haysbert, 2003), and the tipper is Asian or White as opposed to Black or 
Hispanic (Lynn and Thomas-Haysbert, 2003). It is possible that these variables moderate 
the relationship between dollar tip amount and bill size because they reflect differences in 
awareness of the restaurant tipping norm. Supporting this possibility, one study found 
that Blacks are half as likely as Whites to know that the customary restaurant tip is 15 to 
20 percent of the bill and additional, unreported analyses of that study’s data indicated 
that awareness of the norm increases with income and education (Lynn, 2004b). 
       While dollar tips increase with bill size, percentage tips decrease with bill size 
(Green, Myerson and Schneider, 2003).  This effect – known as the “magnitude effect in 
tipping” -- is due to a positive intercept in the relationship between dollar tips and bill 
sizes rather than to a marginal decrease in the positive relationship between these two 
variables (Lynn and Sturman, 2003).  The positive intercept has been attributed to:  
 (1) a tendency to leave a minimum tip when bill size is very small (Lynn and 
Bond, 1992), 
(2) a tendency to add a constant amount for the mere presence of the server to the 
standard percentage tip (Green, et al, 2003),  
(3)) a tendency for some people to be “flat dollar tippers” while others are 
“percentage tippers” (Lynn and Sturman, 2003), and  
(4) a tendency to round-up tip amounts (Azar, 2004a).  
Of these explanations, however, only the “flat dollar tipper” explanation has received any 
empirical support. National surveys indicate that about 20 percent of restaurant tippers 
leave a flat dollar amount rather than a percentage of the bill (Paul, 2001; Speer, 1997) 
and a  computer simulation by Lynn and Sturman (2003) demonstrated that this fact is 
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sufficient to produce the magnitude effect in tipping. 
 
Payment Method 
       Restaurant patrons paying with credit cards generally leave larger bill-adjusted or 
percentage tips than do those paying with cash (Feinberg, 1986; Garrity and Degelman, 
1990; Lynn and Latane, 1984, Lynn and Mynier, 1993). These credit card effects on 
tipping could be due to:  
(1) the reduced psychological cost of delayed payments, 
(2) pre-existing differences between cash and credit-card customers, and/or 
(3) conditioned responses to credit-card stimuli (Feinberg, 1986). 
Consistent with the latter of these explanations, McCall and Belmont (1996) found that 
people tipped more when the bill was presented on tip trays embossed with credit card 
insignia than when it was presented on plain tip trays and that this effect occurred even 
when people paid the bill with cash. 
 
Dining Party Size 
       Large dining parties leave smaller percentage tips than do small dining parties 
(Freeman, Walker, Borden and Latane, 1975; Lynn and Latane, 1984; May, 1980). This 
effect has been attributed to: 
(1) a diffusion of the shared responsibility that each group member has for the 
server (Freeman, et al, 1975), 
(2) an equitable adjustment for the smaller per-person effort involved in waiting 
on larger tables (Snyder, 1976),  
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(3) a cost-reducing adjustment for the larger bill sizes acquired by larger tables (Elman, 
1976), and 
(4) a statistical artifact produced by a positive intercept in the relationship between dollar 
tips and bill sizes (Lynn and Bond, 1992). 
Of these explanations, only the statistical artifact explanation has been empirically 
supported (see Lynn and Bond, 1992). 
 
Service Quality  
        Dining parties that rate the service highly leave larger tips than those who rate the 
service less highly (Lynn and McCall, 2000a). Furthermore, this relationship remains 
statistically significant even after controlling for customers’ food ratings, customer 
patronage frequency, and many other variables (Conlin, et al, 2003). The robustness of 
the effect after controlling for many potential confounds suggests that it is causal – i.e., 
that receiving better service causes people to leave larger tips. Despite its reliability and 
robustness, however, the service-tipping relationship is weak (see Bodvarsson and 
Gibson, 1999; Bodvarsson, Luksetich and McDermott, 2003; Lynn, 2000c, 2004c). 
Customer service ratings account for only 1 to 5 percent of the within-restaurant 
variability between dining parties in tip percentages (Lynn and McCall, 2000a). Similarly 
weak relationships between service and tipping have been observed at the server and 
restaurant levels of analysis (Lynn, 2003b).  
        Several studies have examined potential moderators of the service-tipping 
relationship. A quantitative review of those studies testing the service by patronage 
frequency interaction found that the effects of service on tipping do not vary with the 
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tipper’s frequency of restaurant patronage (see Lynn and McCall, 2000a). However, 
studies testing other interactions have found that the effect of service on tipping is 
moderated by customer ethnicity (Lynn and Thomas-Haysbert, 2003) and day of the 
week (Conlin, et. al., 2003).  Changes in service ratings are associated with larger 
changes in tip percentages among Asians and Hispanics than among Blacks and Whites. 
Changes in service ratings also have a bigger effect on weekday tip percentages than on 
weekend tip percentages. This latter effect may be attributable to the greater control over 
service delivery that servers have on weekdays (which are comparatively slow) than on 
weekends. Supporting this logic, Seligman, Finegan, Hazelwood and Wilkinson (1985) 
found that pizza delivery drivers received lager tips for faster deliveries, but only when 
the tipper believed the driver was personally responsible for the delivery time. 
 
Server Friendliness 
        Although service ratings are only weakly related to tip percentages, server 
friendliness is a moderately strong predictor of tipping. Studies have typically found that 
servers’ verbal and non-verbal signals of friendliness increase tip percentages by 20 to 40 
percent or more (Lynn, 1996, 2003b). For example, servers receive larger percentage tips 
when they: 
(1) introduce themselves by name (Garrity and Degelman, 1990), 
(2) repeat customers’ words when taking food orders (vanBaaren, et al, 2003).  
(3) touch customers lightly on the arm, hand or shoulder (Crusco and Wetzel, 
1984; Hornik, 1992; Lynn, Le and Sherwyn, 1998; Stephen and Zweigenhaft, 
1986), 
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(4) give customers big, open mouthed smiles (Tidd and Lockard, 1978), 
(5) squatt-down next to the table during interactions with customers (Davis, et al, 
1998; Lynn and Mynier, 1993), 
(6) entertain customers with games or jokes (Guegen, 2002; Rind and Strohmetz, 
2001b), 
(7) draw smiley faces or other pictures on the back of checks (Guegen and 
Legoherel, 2000; Rind and Bordia, 1996), 
(8) write “Thank You” or other messages on the backs of checks (Rind and 
Bordia, 1995; Rind and Strohmetz, 1998), and  
(9) call customer by their names when returning credit card slips to be signed 
(Rodrigue, 1999). 
All of these studies involved random assignment of dining-parties to the different 
treatments, so they provide fairly strong evidence that tipping is affected by 
servers’ rapport with customers. 
 
Server and Customer Sex  
        Men sometimes leave larger tips than do women (e.g., Crusco and Wetzel, 1984; 
Lynn and Latane, 1984) and waitresses sometimes receive larger tips than do waiters 
(e.g., Davis, et al, 1998), but these sex effects on tipping are not always found (Lynn and 
Graves, 1996; Lynn and Simons, 2000).  It appears that the effect of customer sex on 
tipping depends on server sex and vice versa. In an unpublished quantitative review of 
the tipping literature, Lynn and McCall (2000b) found that men tipped more than women 
in studies where the server was female while women tipped more than men in studies 
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where the server was male. Furthermore, Conlin, Lynn and O’Donohue (2003) found a 
significant interaction between server and customer sex such that women tipped more 
than men when the server was male but not when the server was female. These findings 
suggest that tipping is affected by the dynamics of sexual attraction. 
 
Customer Patronage Frequency 
        The regular patrons of a restaurant base their tips on bill size more than do new or 
infrequent patrons (Lynn and Grassman, 1990; Lynn and McCall, 2000b), perhaps 
because they are more familiar with the 15 to 20 percent restaurant tipping norm.  They 
also tend to leave larger average tips than do infrequent patrons (Lynn and McCall, 
2000a). This latter effect remains significant even after controlling for customers’ ratings 
of the food and service (Conlin, et. al., 2003; Lynn and Grassman, 1990), so regular 
customers do not tip more merely because they perceive the food and service more 
positively than do infrequent customers. Instead, regular patrons may tip more because 
they are more likely to identify with servers or because they value servers’ approval more 
than do infrequent patrons.   
 
Customer Ethnicity 
        Black restaurant patrons are more likely than White patrons to tip a flat amount 
rather than a percentage of the bill. Blacks also leave smaller average restaurant tip 
percentages than do Whites. This latter effect remains sizable and statistically significant 
after controlling for education, income and perceptions of service quality, so Black-White 
differences in tipping are not due solely to socio-economic differences or to 
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discrimination in service delivery (Lynn and Thomas-Haysbert, 2003; Lynn, 2004). 
Instead, they may be due to ethnic differences in familiarity with the restaurant tipping 
norm. Consistent with this possibility, Lynn (2003) found that Whites were twice as 
likely as Blacks (71% vs 37%) to know that the customary restaurant tip in the United 
States is 15 to 20 percent of the bill amount. 
 
Miscellaneous 
        Among the other variables positively related to bill-adjusted tip amounts in at least 
some studies are: 
(1) alcohol consumption (Conlin, et al, 2003; Lynn, 1988; Sanchez, 2002), 
(2) sunny weather or forecasts of sunny weather (Cunningham, 1979; Crusco and Wetzel, 
1984; Rind and Strohmetz, 2001a), 
(3) metropolitan area size (Lynn and Thomas-Haysbert, 2003; McCrohan and Pearl, 
1983, 1991), 
(4) customer income (Lynn and Thomas-Haysbert, 2003; McCrohan and Pearl, 1983) 
(5) customer youth (Conlin, et al., 2003; Lynn and Thomas-Haysbert, 2003; McCrohan 
and Pearl, 1983), 
(6) customer ratings of food quality (Lynn and McCall, 2000a), 
(7) server personality – i.e., self-monitoring (Lynn and Simons, 2000), 
(8) server physical attractiveness (Hornik, 1992; Lynn and Simons, 2000; May 1980), 
and 
(9) server adornment – i.e., wearing flowers in hair (Stillman and Hensley, 1980).  
 
 9
 Predictors of National Differences in Tipping Norms 
        Tipping varies across nations in terms of who it is customary to tip and how much it 
is customary to tip them. A handful of studies in the psychology and hospitality 
management literatures have attempted to measure these national differences in tipping 
norms and to examine their relationships with other variables. The most commonly 
studied measure of national tipping norms is the number of different service providers 
(out of a list of 33) that it is customary to tip in a nation. I shall refer to this measure as 
the national prevalence of tipping.  Two other measures of national tipping norms are the 
amounts -- in percentages of the bill or fare -- that it is customary to tip restaurant servers 
and taxicab drivers. I shall refer to these measures as national restaurant and taxicab tip-
rates respectively. All of these measures of national tipping norms are based on content 
analyses of international tipping guidebooks.  
       Research on the predictors of these measures has generally focused on national 
character – i.e., national values, motives and personality traits. This focus rests on the 
assumption that tipping norms are primarily determined by consumers. Consumer 
acceptance of these norms is theorized to vary with the value that consumers place on the 
consequences or functions of tipping.  Thus, researchers have examined the relationships 
between national tipping norms and national character traits relevant to those 
consequences and functions. The results of this research are briefly reviewed in the 
paragraphs below. 
 
 Achievement, Materialism and Status 
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        The national prevalence of tipping, the national restaurant tip-rate, and the national 
taxicab tip-rate all increase with Hofstede’s (1983) measure of national commitment to 
traditionally masculine values such as achievement, materialism and status over 
traditionally feminine values such as caring and relationships (Lynn and Lynn, 2004; 
Lynn, Zinkhan and Harris, 1993). The national prevalence of tipping also increases with 
related measures such as national need for achievement, national value placed on 
recognition/status, and national extraversion (Lynn, 1997, 2000a, 2000b).  These findings 
are consistent with the idea that tipping functions as a reward for server performance and 
as a form of consumer status display (Shamir, 1984). 
 
Anxiety and Uncertainty Avoidance 
        The national prevalence of tipping and the national restaurant tip-rate, but not the 
national taxicab tip-rate, increase with Hofstede’s (1983) measure of national desire to avoid 
uncertainty (Lynn and Lynn, 2004; Lynn, Zinkhan and Harris, 1993). The national 
prevalence of tipping also increases with a national personality trait, called “neuroticism,” 
that is associated with heightened anxiety and nervousness (Lynn, 1994; 2000b). These 
findings are consistent with the idea that tipping functions as a guarantee of good and 
friendly service (Lynn and Lynn, 2004).  That uncertainty avoidance is unrelated to national 
taxicab tip-rates may mean that people are less concerned about variability in the behavior 





        The national prevalence of tipping increases with McClelland’s (1961) measure of 
national need for power (Lynn, 2000a). This finding supports the idea that tipping is 
valued as a source of consumer power over servers (Hemenway, 1993). On the other 
hand, national tipping customs are unrelated to Hofsetede’s (1983) measure of national 
acceptance of hierarchical power structures in analyses that statistically control for other 
national values (Lynn and Lynn, 2004; Lynn, Zinkhan and Harris, 1993). These latter 
findings suggest that the power implications of tipping are not an impediment to its 
appeal among egalitarian-minded people. Perhaps, the power over servers that tipping 
confers on consumers is seen by most people as benign or legitimate.  
 
Individualism versus Collectivism 
        National taxicab tip-rates increase with Hofstede’s (1983) measure of national emphasis 
on individual -- as opposed to group -- identity and motivation (Lynn and Lynn, 2004). 
However, national prevalence of tipping and national restaurant tip-rates are unrelated to 
national individualism after controlling for Hofstede’s other values (Lynn and Lynn, 2004; 
Lynn, Zinkhan and Harris, 1993). These inconsistent findings are difficult to explain, but the 
failure to find that communalistic nations tip more service providers or larger amounts than do 
individualistic nations is meaningful. It suggests that the communalistic benefits that tipping 
provides are not an important determinant of the development and spread of tipping norms 
(Levmore, 2000).  
 
Psychoticism 
        The national prevalence of tipping decreases with the average psychoticism score 
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within nations (Lynn, 2000b).  Psychotic people tend to be aggressive, anti-social and un-
empathetic, so this finding supports the idea that tipping norms are supported as a way to 
benefit or help servers.  
 
Tax Burden 
       The national prevalence of tipping decreases with the percentage of the national GDP 
collected in taxes (Schwartz and Cohen, 1999).  This relationship has been attributed to 
the lower disposable income associated with heavier tax burdens. However, this 
explanation assumes that higher national spending power leads to a greater prevalence of 
tipping and my own unpublished analysis indicates that the reverse is true. In a sample of 
32 nations, I found that the national prevalence of tipping was negatively correlated with 
national purchasing power parity (r = -.49, p < .004). 
        Another potential explanation for the negative relationship between national tax 
burdens and tipping customs is that national attitude toward taxes affects both the tax 
burden and the support for norms, like tipping, that facilitate tax evasion. However, an 
unpublished analysis I conducted does not support this explanation.  I found that national 
attitudes toward tax evasion via under-reporting of income was unrelated to both the 
national tax burden (r = -.16, n = 17, p = .55) and the national prevalence of tipping (r = -
.05, n = 16, p = .85). Thus, additional explanations for the relationship between national 
tax burdens and tipping norms are needed. 
 
Economic Theories of Tipping 
        The empirical literature on tipping reviewed above is dominated by psychologists. 
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Only recently have economists begun to collect and analyze data on this phenomenon. 
However, tipping has intrigued economists for some time and has been the subject of 
several economic models, theories and speculations.  Most of these models, theories and 
speculations address one of two questions – (1) Why do rational individuals leave tips? 
and (2) How has the custom of tipping evolved?  Economists’ answers to these questions 
are critically reviewed in the paragraphs that follow.  
 
Individual Motives for Tipping 
       Tipping is a voluntary activity. Although guided by social norms, compliance with 
those norms is not compulsory. This raises a question about why rational people leave 
tips. Economists have generated six different answers to this question. According to 
them, people tip in order to: 
(1) buy future service from servers they will encounter again, 
(2) increase servers’ incomes,  
(3) feel positive feelings like pride or avoid negative feelings like guilt, 
(4) receive social approval/status or avoid social disapproval, 
(5) build an honest character, and  
(6) support the rule of tipping. 
Each of these explanations is critically evaluated in the paragraphs below. 
 
Future Service  
         The hypothesized motive for tipping most consistent with traditional economic 
theory is that people tip in order to buy future service.  This explanation retains the 
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assumption of rational economic man who derives utility only from economic goods and 
services. The strong version of this explanation is that frequent patrons can ensure good 
future service by leaving tip amounts that are contingent on service quality (Ben-Zion 
and Karni, 1977; Lynn and Grassman, 1990). Servers who are aware of this contingency 
and want to improve their tip incomes will then be motivated to deliver good service. 
This reasoning is similar to that underlying the tit-for-tat strategy in iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma games (Axelrod, 1984) and it suggests that the relationship between service and 
tipping should be stronger for regular than for non-regular customers. However, as 
mentioned earlier, tests of the service quality by patronage frequency interaction have 
failed to support this expectation. At the very least, these null results suggest that tippers 
are poor game theorists.  
        A weak form of the future service explanation is that frequent patrons can ensure good 
future service by tipping generously, because servers will be happier to wait on those 
known to be good tippers (Bodvarsson and Gibson, 1994; Frank, 1988; Sisk and Gallick, 
1985). This explanation preserves the traditional models of rational consumers, but 
assumes that servers have irrational desires to repay customers for past generosity by 
supplying good current service.  This version of the future service explanation does have 
the advantage of predicting only a positive effect of patronage frequency rather than a 
service quality by patronage frequency interaction.  As previously mentioned, researchers 
have found substantial evidence that regular customers do tip more than non-regular 
customers, so this weak version is more consistent with the empirical literature than is the 
strong version. However, regular patrons may tip more than non-regular patrons for many 
reasons other than the desire for future service. Furthermore, a national survey asking 
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respondents for the best explanation of why they do or do not tip found that only 3 percent 
of respondents indicated that they tip for future service (Market Facts, 1996). Thus, this 
explanation for tipping needs additional testing.    
 
Helping Servers  
        The traditional economic theory of consumer behavior cannot explain consumers’ 
motives for tipping in restaurants that are infrequently patronized (Ben-Zion and Karni, 
1977). To explain tipping in this situation, several economists have expanded their 
assumptions about consumers’ utility functions. One frequently considered idea is that 
consumers derive utility from increasing servers’ incomes (Azar, 2004b; Frank, 1988; 
Schotter, 1979). In other words, people tip out of feelings of empathy for servers.  This 
idea is consistent with the previously reviewed findings that:  
(1) tips increase with patronage frequency (because familiarity increases empathy), 
(2) tips increase with server friendliness (because friendliness increases empathy), and 
(3) the number of tipped service professions decreases with national psychoticism 
(because psychoticism decreases empathy). It is also consistent with the results of a 
national survey in which 30 percent of respondents indicated that the main reason they tip 
is “because I feel people depend on the money to make a living” (Market Facts, 1996). 
 
Feelings of Pride and Guilt  
        Consumers’ utility functions have also been broadened to include feelings of pride 
and guilt, which are theorized to accompany conformity and non-conformity with 
internalized tipping norms (Azar, 2004a, 2004b; Bodvarsson and Gibson, 1997; Conlin, 
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et al, 2003; Ruffle, 1999). This idea is consistent with the previously reviewed findings 
that dollar tips increase with bill size and that percentage tips increase with service 
quality, because the restaurant tipping norm identifies these variables as important 
determinants of the appropriate tip amount. However, compliance with tipping norms is 
not evidence that those norms are internalized or that feelings of pride or guilt motivate 
compliance with those norms.  Thus, more direct assessments of the relationships 
between tips and anticipated feelings of pride or guilt are needed to evaluate this 
explanation for tipping. 
 
Social Approval and Status  
        Allowing consumers’ utility functions to include social approval and status has also 
been suggested as a way to explain tipping (Azar, 2004a, 2004b; Conlin, et al. 2003; 
Ruffle, 1999). Although sometimes lumped together with feelings of pride and guilt by 
economists trying to explain tipping, the desire for social approval is distinct because it 
varies with the visibility of the tip and the characteristics of observers in a way that 
feelings of pride and guilt do not (see Azar, 2004a; Bodvarsson and Gibson, 1997). In 
fact, the previously reviewed findings that tips increase with patronage frequency, server 
friendliness, server physical attractiveness, and differences between the customers’ and 
servers’ sexes provide support for the social approval explanation of tipping, because all 
these variables should increase the tippers’ concern with the servers’ approval. Also 
supporting this motivation for tipping are the previously reviewed effects on tipping 
customs of national values and personality traits associated with status seeking, because 
these national level effects are difficult to explain if they do not stem from corresponding 
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individual level relationships. However, more direct assessments of the relationship 
between desire for social approval and tipping are needed to further test this explanation. 
 
Character Building Exercise  
         The most novel explanation for tipping advanced by an economist is that tipping is 
done as a character building exercise. According to Robert Frank (1988), the motive 
behind tipping is “... to maintain and strengthen the predisposition to behave honestly.”  
He also suggests that cultivating an honest character is a choice that people make because 
others detect and reward those with an honest character.  Although no empirical tests of 
this motivation for tipping currently exist, the novelty and creativity of the idea seem to 
argue against its validity. If the desire to cultivate an honest character truly motivates 
tipping, then it should have been apparent to others thinking and writing about tipping.   
 
Support the Rule of Tipping 
         A final economic explanation for why individuals leave tips is based on game 
theory. Essentially, the argument is that one person’s tipping or stiffing behavior causes 
others to behave likewise. Furthermore, an equilibrium in which everyone tips is 
preferable to an equilibrium in which no one tips because tipping improves service 
quality. Under these conditions, tipping is motivated by the desire to ensure a preferred 
equilibrium (Bodvarsson and Gibson, 1997; Schotter, 1979). As Bodvarsson and Gibson 
(1997) write: “The act of tipping ... is irrational, but supporting the rule of tipping by 
leaving tips is rational.” Unfortunately, this explanation of tipping is founded on an 
untenable assumption – namely that an individual’s behavior can influence the behavior 
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of enough other people to affect the societal equilibrium. People can and do stiff servers 
without bringing down the whole custom of tipping (see Paul, 2001), so “supporting the 
rule of tipping by leaving tips” is not rational from a self-interested perspective. Also 
undermining this explanation is the previously reviewed finding that the prevalence of 
tipping does not increase with national collectivism, because collectivists should be more 
inclined than individualists to contribute to public goods. 
 
Social Functions of Tipping  
        Tipping is guided by social norms that specify who and how much to tip. This raises 
a question about why tipping norms exist. This question is related, but not identical, to 
the question about why individual consumers tip. Some of the benefits that motivate 
individuals to leave tips may also induce societies to adopt tipping norms. For example, 
the desire for status probably affects individual tipping decisions and national tipping 
customs (see Lynn, 1997). However, norms that induce many people to tip may provide 
benefits that no individual act of tipping can provide. In fact, economists’ explanations 
for tipping norms have focused on this latter type of benefit. The specific benefits 
mentioned by economists are numerous but can be traced to just five basic consequences 
of tipping –  
(1) tipping reduces the costs of monitoring and motivating server effort,  
(2) tipping provides a non-litigious means of addressing problems that arise from failures 
in service delivery (this is a version of the preceding consequence, but is distinct enough 
to warrant separate discussion),  
(3) tipping attracts good waiters to the restaurant industry,  
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(4) tipping facilitates tax evasion, and  
(5) tipping increases profits through price discrimination.  
Each of these consequences of tipping is discussed below. 
 
Efficient Incentive  
        The most common economic explanation for the custom of tipping is that it 
functions as an efficient means of monitoring and rewarding server effort (see Ben-Zion 
and Karni, 1977; Bodvarsson and Gibson, 1997; Conlin, et al, 2003; Hemenway, 1993; 
Jacob and Page, 1980; Schotter, 1979). The highly customized and intangible nature of 
services means that customers are in a much better position than managers to evaluate 
and reward server effort, so these tasks are given to consumers via the norm of tipping. 
This reasoning suggests that tipping reduces transaction costs, motivates servers to work 
hard, and enables restaurants to provide more customized levels of service (see economic 
models of Ben-Zion and Karni, 1977 and Schotter, 1979).  The previously reviewed 
evidence that restaurant tips are positively related to service quality means that tipping 
has some elements of an efficient contract (Conlin, et al, 2003). However, the fact that 
the service-tipping relationship is weaker on weekends than on weekdays and weaker for 
some ethnic groups than others means that tipping is not fully efficient (Conlin, et al, 
2003).  More importantly, the average service-tipping relationship is smaller than the 
correlation of .3 that Cohen (1992) argued is “visible to the naked eye of a careful 
observer.” This means that the relationship is too weak to be noticed by restaurant 
servers, so it seems doubtful that tipping can provide the hypothesized incentive for 
server effort (Lynn, 2001; Lynn and McCall, 2000).  
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 Enforcement Mechanism  
        Sisk and Gallick (1985) do not believe that tips are “used to reward marginal 
increments in service.” Rather they argue that tipping is an enforcement device that 
protects customers against pressures to eat and leave quickly and that protects restaurants 
from unscrupulous complaints about the service. The custom of tipping accomplishes this 
by allowing customers to withhold payment for inadequate service while still requiring 
those customers to pay for the meal (see Schotter, 1979 for a similar argument). Thus, 
tipping acts like a guarantee and provides two benefits – it motivates servers to provide 
adequate service (Sisk and Gallick, 1985) and it reduces the need for costly arguments 
and litigation when the service is inadequate (Schotter, 1979). This explanation for 
tipping is supported by the previously reviewed relationships of tipping customs with 
national uncertainty avoidance and neuroticism, because neurotic and uncertainty-
avoidant people should value guarantees of good treatment more than others (Lynn, 
2000b; Lynn and Lynn, 2004). 
 
Selection Device  
        Andrew Schotter (1979, 2000) argues that tipping is a selection device that separates 
good from bad waiters. He defines good waiters as those who can wait on many 
customers per work shift and poor waiters as those who can wait on only a few customers 
per work shift. Given this definition, the prospect of low tip income will keep poor 
waiters from deciding to work for tips. Thus, Schotter claims that tipping 
disproportionately attracts good waiters to the restaurant industry and helps to solve the 
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problem of adverse selection in employment that restaurant managers face. This 
explanation for tipping could easily be broadened to include more traditional definitions 
of good and poor waiters as long as customers give good servers more tips than they give 
to poor servers. As previously mentioned, however, individual differences in servers’ 
performance are only weakly related to their average tip percentages, so such a 
broadening of the explanation is not supported by the available data. Note that this weak 
empirical relationship is not inconsistent with Schotter’s original explanation, because he 
assumes that good waiters earn larger dollar (not percentage) tips than do poor servers. 
That assumption has yet to be empirically tested. 
 
Tax Evasion  
        Bodvarsson and Gibson (1997) argued that tipping is supported in part because it 
facilitates tax evasion. Tipping allows servers to pay lower income taxes because under-
reporting of tip income is more difficult for the government to catch than is under-reporting 
of standard wages. In fact, a study by the Internal Revenue Service found that under-
reporting of tip income exceeds under-reporting of income from all other legal sources (IRS, 
1990). In addition, tipping allows customers to pay lower sales taxes because (by lowering 
restaurants’ labor costs) it reduces the prices restaurants charge for meals. Together, these tax 
evasion opportunities benefit customers, servers, and restaurateurs by reducing the costs of 
supplying services (Bodvarsson and Gibson, 1997; Schwartz and Cohen, 1999). However, 
the previously reviewed finding that tipping is more prevalent in countries with lower tax 
burdens casts doubt on the idea that tipping exists as a means of evading taxes.  The 
motivation to evade taxes should be greater the higher those taxes, so if tipping customs are 
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actively supported because they are a means of evading taxes, then tipping should be more 
(not less) prevalent the greater a nation’s tax burden. 
 
Price Discrimination   
        Finally, Zvi Schwartz (1997) developed a demand-supply model of tipping in 
segmented markets and showed that tipping increases firm profits under many (but not 
all) conditions. Basically, he argued that tipping is a form of price discrimination that 
allows restaurants to charge high prices for the food without losing business from price 
sensitive customers as long as those customers are willing and able to reduce the total 
cost of eating out by leaving smaller tips. Unfortunately, no empirical data that could be 
used to test this model is currently available.  
 
Public Policy Issues Concerning Tipping 
        Tipping is a private exchange between a customer and a service provider.  
Nevertheless, it raises important public policy issues. Among the tipping related 
questions that public policy makers must address are the following: (1) Should tipping be 
banned or not?, (2) How can under-reporting of cash tip income be detected and/or 
reduced?, and (3) Should mandated minimum wages be lower for tipped jobs than for 
non-tipped jobs? Each of these questions is discussed in the paragraphs below.  
 
 Ban on Tipping 
        Tipping is widespread, but is not universally loved. For over a hundred years, people 
in the United States have disliked the practice and tried to stop it (Azar, 2004a). In the 
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early 1900’s for example, Arkansas, Mississippi, Iowa, South Carolina, Tennessee, and 
Washington State all passed laws prohibiting tipping (Segrave, 1998). Although currently 
legal throughout the United States, one national survey indicates that 24 percent of U.S. 
adults still think the practice is unfair to consumers (Roper, 2002) and another indicates 
that 34 percent of U.S. adults wish they were not expected to tip (Mills and Riehle, 1987). 
Dissatisfaction with tipping also extends beyond the borders of the United States. 
Europeans have largely replaced tipping with automatic service charges (Segrave, 1998) 
and the practice of tipping is actually illegal in Argentina and Vietnam (Magellan’s, 
2003). This negative sentiment raises a question about whether tipping increases or 
decreases social welfare and, therefore, should be permitted or banned.   
        As described in the previous section, economists have argued that the institution of 
tipping provides numerous social benefits, such as increasing service quality, increasing 
profits, reducing transaction costs, reducing litigation, and reducing tax burdens. 
Economists have also argued that tipping must provide some individual benefits to 
consumers apart from avoidance of the guilt and social disapproval brought on by non-
compliance with tipping norms (Azar, 2004b; Schlicht, 1998). Otherwise, they argue, 
self-interest would lead to slight under-tipping, which would eventually erode the tipping 
norm itself. Social scientists in other disciplines have identified a number of candidates 
for those individual benefits – including a reduction of consumer anxiety about servers’ 
envy of their customers (Foster, 1972; Lynn, 1994), a reduction of consumer guilt about 
the inequality between servers and customers (Shamir, 1984), an increase in the 
consumer’s social recognition and status (Lynn, 1997; Paules, 1991), an increase in the 
consumer’s self-perceived freedom (Shamir, 1984), and an increase in the consumer’s 
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psychological rewards from helping servers (Shamir, 1984).  
         Balanced against the hypothesized benefits of tipping described above are several 
potential negative consequences of this custom. Tipping is thought to demean servers 
(Hemenway, 1993; Segrave, 1998) and it does increase the income-uncertainty and role-
conflict experienced by servers (Butler and Skipper, 1980; Shamir, 1983).  Tipping also 
encourages servers to: (a) rush customers in order to turn tables quickly, (b) give 
customers food and drink items free of charge, (c) spend little time or effort on groups 
considered poor tippers, and (d) evade taxes by under-reporting their tip incomes. More 
importantly, tipping norms put unwelcome social pressure on consumers to part with 
money they would rather keep (Crespi, 1947; Segrave, 1998).   
         Given the prevalence of tipping, it is tempting to assume that the benefits of this 
custom must outweigh its costs, but that assumption is not justified. Many of the 
hypothesized collective benefits of tipping have not been empirically demonstrated.  In 
fact, the principle benefit attributed to tipping – that it increases service quality – is 
doubtful because tip amounts are only weakly related to service quality (Lynn and 
McCall, 2000a). Of course, the previously reviewed relationships between tipping 
customs and national values and personality traits suggests that some of the hypothesized 
psychological benefits actually do contribute to the evolution and maintenance of tipping 
norms (see Lynn, 2000a, 2000b; Lynn and Lynn, 2004). However, it is possible that these 
benefits accrue to only a small subset of consumers and that most tippers unhappily 
follow the lead of this subset only to avoid social embarrassment. Thus, it is unclear if 
benefits of tipping outweigh its costs; more theoretical and empirical work is needed to 
answer that question. 
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 Undeclared Tip Income 
        The Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) estimates that 50 percent of tip income is 
unreported, which results in the loss of tax revenue and a lowering of the perceived 
fairness of the income tax system (IRS, 1990). In order to identify cheaters, tax auditors 
need accurate estimates of servers’ actual tip incomes (McCrohan and Pearl, 1992). Two 
approaches to this task have been analyzed in the economics literature and are briefly 
discussed below. 
         The approach to estimating tip income currently used by the I.R.S. is to adjust the 
charge tip rate in a restaurant by some amount and to apply that rate to a restaurant’s and 
its server’s cash sales. This approach, known as the McQuatters formula, has been upheld 
by the courts (Newman, 1988). However, MacNaughton and Veall (2001) have 
demonstrated that use of this formula can make the marginal tax rate on credit card tips 
exceed 100 percent and they argue that this may undermine the formula’s acceptability to 
the public. Furthermore, Newman (1988) suggests that estimating tip income on a 
restaurant by restaurant basis is cumbersome and that alternative approaches should be 
sought. 
        In the mid 1980’s, McCrohan and Pearl (1991) worked on such an alternative 
approach to predicting tip income. They used data from diaries kept by consumer panels 
to predict tipping rates from restaurant-level variables such as geographic location, 
metropolitan area size, restaurant practices, and restaurant type.  They found that 
“effective tipping rates were highest in Middle Atlantic and New England States and 
Lowest in North and South Central States; highest in large metropolitan areas; highest in 
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restaurants that accept credit cards and lowest in those that do not accept credit cards, 
accept reservations, or serve alcoholic beverages; and highest (of major restaurant 
categories) in full menu and hotel restaurants and lowest in pizza restaurants” (p. 230). 
Their regression models represent one alternative approach to estimating tip income that 
tax authorities could use in auditing restaurants and servers (Newman, 1988). Coming up 
with still more means of predicting tip income or of increasing tip reporting is one 
potentially fruitful direction for future economic research. 
 
Tipped Minimum Wages 
         Tips represent taxable income in the United States and elsewhere.  As a 
governmentally recognized part of income, tips raise a question about how much they 
should be counted toward legally mandated minimum wages.  Not surprisingly, low 
income workers tend to oppose the crediting of tips against minimum wage requirements 
(see MacKenzie and Snyder, 2001). However, this is a complex issue whose merits rest 
on more than workers’ preferences. For example, Wessels (1997) theorized that “the 
labor market for tipped restaurant servers is monopsonistic” and that the employment of 
these servers first increases and then decreases with rises in the tipped minimum wage. 
The basic idea is that tipping constrains how many servers a restaurant can hire because 
more servers per customer mean fewer tips and fewer tips must be offset with higher 
wages. Increasing the tipped minimum wage allows restaurants to improve service by 
hiring more servers even though it reduces servers’ tip incomes because the higher wages 
compensate for the reduced tips. Of course, the benefits to restaurants of hiring more 
servers are marginally declining, so at some point further increasing the tipped minimum 
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wage merely increases the costs of labor and reduces employment. Wessels tested this 
model with two different data sets and found strong support for it. Thus, a lowering of the 
tipped minimum wage by allowing tip credits can reduce employment over at least some 
range of minimum wages.  This counter-intuitive finding illustrates the complexity of the 
issues concerning tip credits and tipped minimum wages and, in so doing, illustrates the 





        In conclusion, tipping is a widespread and practically important economic behavior. 
Moreover, it is a behavior that is difficult for neoclassical theory to explain.  At the 
individual level of analysis, people leave tips even when they are infrequent patrons of a 
service establishment and are unlikely to encounter the same service worker again. 
Furthermore, individuals’ decisions about how much to tip are affected by a host of 
variables unrelated to service levels. Thus, explanations for this behavior must go beyond 
the neoclassical idea that people base tips on service quality to ensure good service in the 
future. Adequately explaining individuals’ tipping decisions requires a more behavioral 
approach – one that broadens the traditional consumer utility function to include desires 
to avoid guilt, obtain social approval, obtain status, treat others equitably, and help others 
as well as one that recognizes cognitive capacity, knowledge, mood, and other cold, 
cognitive processes as having a causal impact on economic decision making and 
behavior.   
         At an aggregate level of analysis, tipping norms vary across nations and appear to 
be affected by national variables unrelated to transaction costs or the supply and demand 
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for services. Thus, explanations for tipping norms must go beyond the idea that they are 
efficient means of monitoring and rewarding server performance. Adequately explaining 
tipping norms requires a behavioral perspective that encompasses national character and 
values as well as social learning and conformity. 
        Scholars in hospitality management and psychology have made numerous 
contributions to our understanding of tipping behavior and a few economists have begun 
to explore this topic. However, more economists should study tipping because it promises 
to shed light on the content of consumers’ utility functions, the role of social norms in the 
economy, and the evolution of economic institutions. Furthermore, economists should 
study tipping because it has an impact on important public policy issues of concern to 
economists. Rational or not, most economists leave tips; it is time they begin to study 
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